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PLEADING AND PRACTICE-WHAT CONSTrrUTES ABANDONMENT OF
Surr--Sliman instituted a suit against Araguel. After a partial
trial of the case, on March 8, 1933, it was continued to be reas-
signed for trial. No further action was taken until June 20, 1940,
when the case, on the moion of plaintiff, was placed on the call
docket of the lower court for reassignment. During this period
of non-prosecution, there had been correspondence between the
parties, who were seeking an agreed statement of facts. Defen-
dant moved to have the suit dismissed on the ground of non-
prosecution for five years. Held, the failure to take any step in
the prosecution of the suit during five years amounted to an
abandonment under Article 3519 of the Civil Code. Only formal
moves before the court, and not extra-judicial acts done in pals,
are steps in the prosecution within the meaning of the article.
Sliman v. Araguel, 200 So. 280 (La. 1941).
The filing of suit constitutes an interruption of prescrip-
tion on the cause of action.' But if the suit is abandoned or
voluntarily discontinued, 2the interruption is considered as never
having occurred. 8 A suit is considered abandoned when "the
plaintiff having made his demand shall at any time before
obtaining final judgment allow five years to elapse without hav-
ing taken any steps in the prosecution thereof."'
A step in the prosecution of a suit is "something more than
a niere passive effort to keep the suit on the docket of the court;
it means some active measure taken by plaintiff, intended and
calculated to hasten the suit to judgment."'5 The court in the
1. La. Act 89 of 1982 [Dart's Stas. (1939) I 206.1], superseding ArL ;518.
La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. "Discontinued" as here used means the dismissal of suit on motion
resulting in a non-suit, as provided by Arts. 491, 492, 532, La. Code of Prao-
tice of 1870.
& Art. 8519, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Ibid. The abandonment only prevents the continuing of that suit by
the plaintiff. It does not bar the filing of another action. Teutonia Loan &
Building Co. v. Connolly, 18 La. 401, 63 So. 63 (19"); Charbonnet v. State
Realty Co., 155 La. 1044, 99 So 865 (1924); Franek v. Turner, 164 La. 532, 114
So. 148 (1927); Losch v. Greco, 173 La. 223, 136 So. 572 (1931).
5. Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 816, 112 So. 731, 732 (1927).
See also State ex reL Yazoo & M. V. 1. R. v. Edrington, 11 OrL App. 288
(La. App. 1914). Defending a premature motion to dismiss for want of
prosecution is not a step within Article 3519. Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley,
163 La. 814, 112 So. 71 (1927). A motion for permission to withdraw the
record is not a step forwarding the progress of the case in court. ips v.
Royal Ins. Co., 149 rL 359, 89 So. 213 (1921). Issuance and service of cita- ,
tion is not a step by the plaintiff. Seligman v. Scott, 17 La. App. 48, "d
Be. 71 (1981). If an exception is pending qo that a default judgment
eoul4 not be entered, the filing of an answer by the defendant is not a step
the imlati, Lips v. Royal InsL Co., 149 La. 3, 80 So. 213 (1921). How-
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present case reiterates the rule that the step must be taken
before the court and cannot be a mere informal action by the
plaintiff nor simple negotiations between the counsel in the case.6
The presumption of abandonment created by Article 3519 is
not conclusive. The plaintiff is permitted to show the reasons
for his failure to prosecute the case further.' But in order to pre-
vent the suit from being considered abandoned, the plaintiff must
show that the reasons for non-prosecution were circumstances
beyond his control and were such as to make it impossible for
him to take any step." The case is not considered abandoned if
the failure to take a step is due to the delay of a judge in render-
ing a decision on an exception or application for injunction,9 or
is occasioned by the fact that the proceedings were stayed by a
court order."0
Although five years elapse without any step having been
taken by the plaintiff, the abandonment and dismissal is not
automatic.1 The defendant must move for the dismissal. The
right to demand dismissal may be waived by the defendant by
joining with the motion to dismiss a plea to the merits 2 or
ever, It has been said that the filing of an exception to plaintiff's action
is a step by plaintiff. Howcott v. Petit, 130 La. 791, 797, 58 So. 574, 576
(1912). But if the case is "ripe for default," the filing of an answer to
prevent a default judgment is under the stress of necessity created by
the plaintiff and is considered as a step by the plaintiff. Lips v. Royal Ins.
Co., 149 La. 359, 89 So. 213 (1921); Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 191 La. 791,
186 So. 338 (1939). A formal motion by the plaintiff to have the case placed on
the summary call docket is a step In the prosecution. Cocke v. Cavalier, 175
La. 151, 143 So. 33 (1932); Jones v. American Bank & Trust Co., 175 La.
160, 143 So. 35 (1932).
6. State ex rel. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Edrington, 11 Orl. App. 288 (La.
App. 1914).
7. Bell v. Staring, 170 So. 502 (La. App. 1936); Harrisonburg-Catahoula
State Bank v. Meyers, 185 So. 96 (La. App. 1938), noted In (1939) 13 Tulane
L. Rev. 641.
8. Bell v. Staring, 170 So. 502 (La. App. 1936). Ignorance of the fact
that the judge has acted on a pending motion is no excuse for plaintiff's
inaction. Ibid. Death of an attorney who had an interest in plaintiff's suit,
with the result that it could not be settled or compromised without permis-
ion of the attorney, was not cause for plaintiff's non-prosecution. Nix v.
Wight, 8 La. App. 402 (1926). Failure of the clerk of court to file the
transcript does not excuse plaintiff's inaction, since the plaintiff can com-
pel the filing of the transcript. Landry v. Dore, 149 So. 321 (La. App4
1933).
9. Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 71 So. 134 (1916).
10. Cotonla v. Richardson, 4 Orl. App. 280 (La. App. 1907).
11. Hlibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. 3. M. Dresser Co., 14 La. App. 555,
131 So. 752 (1931), cited with approval in King v. Illinois Central R.R., 143
So. 95, 97 (La. App. 1932).
12. Gelsenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906); Continental
Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101, 100 So. 64 (1924).
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other plea.' 8 Likewise, the right of the defendant to have the
case dismissed is waived by judgment being rendered without
objection on the part of defendant."
The failure of any party except the plaintiff to take active
steps in the prosecution does not amount to an abandonment."
Consequently, abandonment for failure to take steps under
Article 3519 applies only to cases in courts of original jurisdic-
tion, where the plaintiff must carry the case forward, and not to
those on appeal.'6 To hold otherwise would mean that a plaintiff-
appellant would be required to take a step within five years while
a defendant-appellant would not.
The instant case is merely another expression of the court
evidencing an intention to carry out the legislative intent of
punishing the plaintiff when he allows his case to be prolonged."'
M.M.H.
WORKMENS COMPENSATION-PREMATURITY OF CLAIM-In Sep-
tember of 1936 plaintiff, while performing his work, developed a
hernia and submited to an operation on February 25, 1937. He
returned to work May 22, 1937; and on August 1, 1937, there was
a recurrence of the rupture. Suit was filed on June 18, 1938. Dur-
ing this period plaintiff performed lighter duties. Nevertheless,
up to the date of the trial he was paid his regular wages. He seeks
compensation for permanent and total disability under Section
8 (1) (b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act-compensation to
run from September, 1936. Held, on rehearing, the plaintiff was
13. King v. Illinols Central R.R., 143 So. 95 (La. App. 1932), where the
joinder of a motion to revoke an order permitting the filing of a sup-
plemental petition was held to waive the right to have the suit dismissed.
14. Harrtsonburg-Catahoula State Bank v. Meyers, 185 So. 96 (La. App.
1938), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 641.
15. Reagan v. Louisiana Western R.R., 148 La. 754, 79 So. 328 (1918),
where it was held that a defendant appealing to the district court from ajustice of the peace court is nbt a plaintiff and that five years inaction on
his part did not amount to an abandonment.
Likewise, only the plaintiff is precluded by abandonment from con-
tinuing the case. The abandonment by plaintiff cannot be raised against
an expert seeking costs. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. J. M. Dresser Co.,
14 La. App. 555, 131 So. 752 (1931).
16. Verrett v. Savoie, 174 La. 844, 141 So. 854 (1932).. This case
expressly repudiates the contrary ruling of City of New Orleans v. New
Orleans Jockey Club, 129 La. 64, 55 So. 711 (1911); Hibernia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Jacob A. Zimmerman & Sons, 167 La. 751, 120 So. 283 (1929); Good
v. Picone, 18 La App. 42, 137 So. 870 (1931).
17. For a discussion of the legislative intent, see Lockhart v. Lock-
hart, 118 La. 872, 37 So. 860 (1905).
